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Comments
PATENTING MICROORGANISMS: WORKING THE BUGS
OUT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEPOSITARY
AUTHORITY
Mark Twain once wrote: "A country without good patent laws
is just a crab and can't travel any way but sideways and
backways."' If his statement has any merit, the world is but a paralytic crab with respect to the modernistic era of genetic
engineering. 2
Genetic experimentation has become an international commonplace.3 Developments in genetic research have already provided society with dynamic technological advances.
Pharmaceutical laboratories, for example, have developed vaccines
from genetically altered microorganisms which have helped diminish many types of poultry, bovine and porcine diseases.4 Microorganisms have been created which synthesize human insulin.5
Future experiments are predicted to accomplish even greater advances.6 Developments through genetic experimentation undoubtedly will provide society with alternative fuel supplies, chemicals to
1. Quoted in Whale, Patents and Genetic Engineering 14 INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 93
(1982). It was Judge Rich of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) speaking
through the United States Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 206
U.S. Pat.

Q.

193 (,1980) who saved the U.S. patent te m

btem
eing "it

a crah" with

respect to products of new technology. Id
2. Teschemacher, Patentabilityof Microorganismsperse, 13 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGHT L. 27, 28 (1982).

3. After World War II, the technology for producing penicillin and streptomycin by
fermentation was introduced by the United States and caused revolutionary developments in
Japan. Today over twenty antibiotics invented by Japanese scientists are in production in
this country and the microbial strain used is the key to each product or process. Hayashi, .4
Japanese Perspective on Patenting Microorganisms, 7 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 306 (1979).
4. These experiments have international significance. Many of the major pharmaceutical industries derive a substantial portion of their profits through international sales. The
economic benefits of providing a uniform international patent system would be attractive to
these industries. See Reinbold, Bacteria Tycoons Start a Real Growth Industry, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 3, 1980, at E8, col. 3.
5. See Aharonowitz & Cohen, The MicrobiologicalProduction ofPharmaceuticals,Sci.
AM., Sept. 1981, at 151.

6. "[One] main reason for the excitement is recent advances in identifying genes called
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aid in food production and, possibly, a cure for cancer.7
The laws regulating and protecting these experiments and their
subsequent inventions continue, however, to sputter at an inchoate
stage. Although a few countries have enacted statutes that recognize the patentability of man-made microorganisms, there is little
uniformity within the patenting process.8 The Budapest Treaty was
conceived in 19779 to help create some uniformity. I0 The Treaty
established a system of depositaries" for the collection and maintenance of microbial products, which are the subject of inventions,
where patent protection has been sought. 2 Recently, several member nations have expressea discomfort with the safety and functioning of the system of depositaries. Some countries have gone so far
as to enact regulatory laws
which undermine one of the original
3
objectives of the Treaty.'
This Comment will explore the patent laws governing manmade life forms and discuss two major areas of international cononcogenes-that appear to be involved in producing cancer." San Diego Union, Feb. 20,
1983, at Al, col. 4.
7. A cancer cell is a cell that has lost the ability to control its growth and division. It is
now known that viruses cause this unregulated division. Many researchers hope that experiments with interferon, a chemical derived from humans with the aid of microorganisms, will
yield a product that will interrupt the growth of these cancer cells. J. WATSON, MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 684 (1977).
8. See Whale, supra note 1,at 106.
9. Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposits of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure, April 28, 1977, T.I.A.S. No. 9768 [hereinafter
cited as Budapest Treaty]. The Budapest Treaty was subsequently amended in 1981. As of
March 1, 1982, the signatories were: Bulgaria, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Japan, Liechtenstein, Philippines, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
of America and the USSR. The following countries are likely future members: Australia,
Austria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland; Democratic Republic of Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Sweden and Yugoslavia. W. BIGGART, B. BRUNSUOLD, D. CONLIN, I. KILEY & R.
SCHWAAB, GENETIC ENGINEERING WORLDWIDE THE LAW AND BUSINESS 14-15 (1982) [hereinafter cited as PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, IlNC.].
Editor'snote.- As ofpublication,the Budapest Treaty hasnot been listed in any other treaty
service.
10. This Treaty will be discussed at length later in this Comment; see infra text § Il1. At
this point it should be noted that prior to the enactment of this treaty, many of the major
countries established their own laws with regard to patenting microorganisms; see also Lederer, A Perspective on PatentingMicroorganisms, 7 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 288 (1980).
11. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9. The depositaries are collection laboratories which
contain facilities designed to store microorganisms; see also infra text accompanying notes
129-145.
12. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 12.
13. Germany and Korea presently restrict exportation of patented microorganisms. In
Germany the patent applicant has a legal right to prohibit third parties from removing microbial samples from territories covered by German patent law. Id. at 80-81.
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cern: the dangers of uncontrolled transportation of potentially
harmful microorganisms; and the suppressive effect on international patenting caused by sovereign supervision over the transportation of microbial inventions.' 4 A cursory examination of
domestic and international patent laws will illustrate the lack of
uniformity of the various patent systems. The unique nature of the
patenting of life forms will then be discussed. This inquiry will
establish the need for uniformity in patenting man-made life forms.
A detailed discussion of the Budapest Treaty will follow, and
arguments for and against the depositary system will be addressed.
Those opposed can cite the Paris Union Convention15 as international precedent. 16 Moreover, these same nations assert sovereign
scrutiny over the importation and exportation of patented life
forms is essential to prevent international infringement, maintain
domestic mores and ensure worldwide safety. The nations favoring
the system maintain that international depositaries are essential to
encourage communication of novel information.' 7
Imaginative and invaluable products are being discovered
every day. A proper system of international patent protection is
essential to purvey the suitable incentive to reach these goals. Authorities must therefore create a more appropriate international
patenting system for man-made microorganisms. In conclusion,
provisions for an amplified treaty, which could alleviate many of
the concerns presented, will be proposed. A revised treaty should
put Mark Twain's crab back on course.
I.

THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEMS

A.

Origins

Historically, legal minds have recognized the inherent "right"
of originators to at least receive credit when others utilize their
14. See infra text accompanying notes 238-269.
15. See Landau, Multinational Corporationsand Lesser Developed Countries-Foreign
Investment, Transfer of Technology, and the Paris Union Convention: Caveat Investor, 5 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 105, 136 (1980).

16. "The international obligation of countries that have approved a treaty to give internal effect to its provisions is a prerequisite for the fruitful and almost global cooperation
among the 88 states of differing political and economic structures which, today, adhere to the
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property concluded in Paris in 1883 and ultimately revised in Stockholm in 1967." Gansser, Violations of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of IndustrialProperty, 63 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 138 (1980).
17. See infra text and accompanying notes 57-63.
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ideas.'" An idea which spawns a marketable product provides a
valuable contribution to society. These originators deserve to be
rewarded for their contributions.' 9 Moreover, worthwhile ideas
benefit society only when the results of the ideas are made widely
available.2" Once available, the new information will increasingly
enable others to invent more novel products.2 '
Patent law was the progeny of that area of property law which
recognized the need to govern both the incentives for and the availability of new ideas. 22 The function of the law is to provide an incentive for experimenters to develop ideas which benefit society.2 3
'Wlien tLe law 'ais,new ideas are iost or never even :"born." Ai aw
that does not properly protect an inventor's property right hardly
24
encourages the development of subsequent ideas.
In the United States, patent law was the creation of Congress.25 Other countries, under the authority of their constitutions,
similarly have created statutory law designed to encourage experimentation.26 Most countries accomplish this task by granting the
experimenters an exclusive right to their inventions for a limited
18. Ideas in and of themselves are not patentable subject matter. It is the resulting
product of that idea which may be legally protected. OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT REP. ch. 12, at
237 (1981).
19. The U.S.A. Patent Act of 1793, authored by Thomas Jefferson, embodied the philosophy that ingenuity should receive liberal encouragement. 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75-76 (Washington ed. 1871).
20. The most common element of the patent statutes around the world is enablement.
This means that most countries would not recognize a product as being patentable unless the
invention's full description enables others with similar skills to reproduce it. PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 136-37.
21. The term "inventing around the invention" is often used to explain how many novel
products are created through improvement of prior art. See OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT REP.,

supra note 18, at 244.
22. Patent law was the legal system designed to provide government-sanctioned remedies and a means to protect inventors' rights in their unique contributions to society. I.
KAYTON, KAYTON ON PATENTS I-1 (1980).

23. G. COPLEIN, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PATENT LAW 31 (1980).
24. There is a great expense in developing ideas into novel products. For an overview
of the procedures involved, see B. LANDIS, PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND TRADE
SECRETS FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL AND GENERAL PRACTITIONERS 92 (1979).
25. The federal patent statutes are derived from the United States Constitution. Article

1, § 8 reads: "The Congress shall have [the] power... to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries..
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 57 (1978).
26. G. FLONZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 9 (1975). Accord-

ing to Article 73, § 9, "[tlhe Federation of the Federal Republic of West Germany shall have
the exclusive power to legislate . . . industrial property rights, copyrights and publishers'
rights..." Id. at 35.
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period of time. 27 During this period, the experimenter's new invention becomes published and accessible to the public as long as that
person receives compensation from anyone who uses, makes or
sells the invention.2 8 Compensation is generally received in the
form of royalties supplied by the company which utilizes the invention to create other marketable and unique products. 29 These procedures, however, only apply to those products which are
patentable.
B.

PatentableSubject Matter

Patent statutes in most nations require four essential criteria in
order to consider an invention patentable.3" First, an invention
must be capable of classification as a machine, process, manufacture or composition of matter.3 1 Most countries have found products of nature, scientific principles and mathematical formulas to be
unpatentable since such discoveries are only derived from preexistent entities. 32 In other words, the invention must have the attribute of utility.3 3 Second, the invention must be novel: new and
useful. The requirements for novelty do not exist under United
States law3 4 if (a) the inventor is not the applicant for the patent, (b)
27. See OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT REP., supra note 18, at 238. A patent gives the creator
the right to exclude all others from making, using or selling his invention for the statutory
period of time. In the United States the statutory period is 17 years; in West Germany the
duration is 18 years. See also B. SINNOT, 2C WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE art. 3, at 2
(1982).
28. See OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT REP., supra note 18, at 238; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101
(1976).
29. Royalties can be set in a large variety of ways. The following are some of the most
common: percentage on sales, fixed sum per unit sold, straight scale versus varying scale,
fully paid-up license, use royalty, entire market value rule and a minimum royalty rule. L.
PRETTY, PATENT LAW FOR THE BUSINESS LAWYER 45 (1981).
30. G. SPENCER, INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 44 (1973).

31. In Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609 (1887), the United States Supreme Court
defines a manufacture or composition of matter to mean a product of human ingenuity "having a distinctive name, character and use." Id. at 615.
32. The laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract ideas have been held not to be
patentable in the U.S. Therefore, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant
found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not have patented his celebrated E=mc 2 , nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are "manifestations of. . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none."
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 33 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
33. Ideas have utility only when they are fully developed. "One may not patent a mere
idea, although novel and useful; an idea must be reduced to practice and practical methods
of making and using it must be described so as to enable the public to use the invention."
Wayne v. Humble Oil Refining Co., 175 F. 2d 230, 233 (1949).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). In France, in order for an invention to be considered novel,
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the invention was previously known or used by others in either the
United States or other countries, or (c) the invention's description
was previously in a foreign patent or publication.35 Third, the invention must not be obvious to one skilled in the arts.36 Obviousness can be determined by considering the differences between
previously patented inventions and the design claimed for protection. Fourth, the description of the invention must enable duplicaskilled individuals in the same area of
tion by reasonably
37
technology.
Although these four elements are required in many of the major c,.u iases, vanatioris du exis. -- For example, the dednition of
"patentable subject matter" under the European Patent Convention 39 is limited to one sentence:4" "European patents shall be
the invention must not be included in the "state of the art." See G. SPENCER, supra note 30,
at 63.
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). The West German patent system is composed of two
branches: The Patentgesetz, the formal patent law, and the Gebrauchsmustergesets, the
petty patent system. The Patentgesetz grants long term monopolies to inventions which fulfill stringent requirements. The Gebrauchsmustergesets grants short term monopolies to
products which satisfy less strict novelty requirements. The formal system has novelty requirements similar to the United States patent system. The Gebrauchsmustergesets requires
the invention to be novel in arrangement, embodiment or device. See E. STRINGHAM, PATENTS AND GEBRAUCHSMUSTER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (1935). Novelty of arrangement
(Anordnumg) distinguishes the originality of the spatial arrangement of the parts of the invention. Novelty of embodiment (Gestalung) refers to inventiveness of form, material, or
surface. Novelty of the device (Vorrichtung) takes into consideration the novelty of arrangement and embodiment factors. Id.
36. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). The U.S. standard for nonobviousness has been criticized
for being inflexible. No degrees or levels of obviousness are recognized by the U.S. statute.
The Federal Republic of Germany's requirement of nonobviousness under the Patentgesetz
and the Gebrauchsmustergesets has some flexibility. Germany's statute permits a dual standard of recognition. Under the obviousness criteria, Erfindungshoehe mandates that the invention manifest substantial improvement over prior art. See Busse, Probleme des
Gebrauchsmusterrechts, 54 GROR 123, 124 (1952).
37. In West Germany the requirement is that the invention must be susceptible of exploitation in industry and trade. G. SPENCER, supra note 30, at 63, 159; see also Blumcraft of
Pittsburgh v. U.S., 372 F.2d 1014, 178 Ct. Cl. 798 (1967).
38. For the purpose of expediency, the reader is asked to consider these four elements as
being the requirements for patentability of the countries discussed in this Comment. A compilation of many different countries' requirements would confuse the reader's understanding
of why life forms can be considered patentable. See SPENCER, supra note 30, at 63.
39. Convention on the Grant of European Patents and Attached Annexes and Draft
Guidelines [hereinafter cited as EPC], also known as the Munich Patent Convention, adopted
in Munich, Oct. 5, 1973, entered intoforce Oct. 7, 1977. J. SINNOTT, 2L WORLD PATENT
LAWS 1 (1978). The EPC was designed to grant an option to worldwide inventors for obtaining foreign patents beyond simply filing separate applications in each country. It should
be noted that the EPC was created to ease the problems involved in patenting inaminate
objects in foreign countries. This Comment deals with the Budapest Treaty which was
designed to eliminate the problems in patenting "live" inventions abroad. See Winner, Prac-
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granted for any inventions which are new, susceptible of industrial
application and which indicate an inventive step.'
The requirements for protecting inventions traditionally applied only to inanimate objects.42 Within the last decade, however,
many countries have recognized that certain genetically engineered
microorganisms are also patentable. 43 The current international
trend favors the patentability of various life forms.
C. The Patentabilityof Living Organisms
Although several countries contemplated the patentability of
microorganisms as early as the 1920's, it was not until the late
1970's that a few major countries determined certain life forms to
be capable of legal protection by patents. 44 West Germany, Japan
and Great Britain were among the first countries which regarded
microorganisms as per se4 5 patentable.46
The United States has reached a similar conclusion. In 1980,
4 7 held that
the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty
a live,
man-made microorganism could qualify as patentable subject matticalEffects ofthe Patent CooperationTreaty and the European PatentConvention on Domestic
Technology Management and PatentPractice, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 419 (1980).
40. EPC, supra note 39, art. 52:1.
41. "The EPC definition is extraordinarily general and broad. Rather than providing a
clear, positive definition of patentable subject matter, the EPC takes the approach of narrowing this broad definition by explicitly specifying negative restrictions thereto." PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 38.
42. "No doubt, when 100 years ago the various patent systems were created, those who
drafted the patent laws did not have the intention to provide for inventions which related to
anything alive. Neither did they have the -intention to exclude such iventons; it isjust
because they did not contemplate living matter, because the patent system was primarily
intended to serve industry and in those days industry did not comtemplate living matter as
part of its concerns." Lederer, supra note 10, at 296.
43. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 137.
44. In a decision concerning a patent on a process for the manufacture of a medicament
useful against tuberculosis and made up of the cultivation of tortoise, the German Patent
Office, upheld by the Reichsgericht (the governing body in Germany), did not reject the
patentability of a biological process made up of living matter. Lederer, supra note 10, at 289.
45. "Per se" means, in this situation, that the product will be accepted as long as the
Patent Examining Office determines that it is novel, nonobvious and useful.
Up until about 1979, it was considered that microorganisms per se could not be
patented in Japan, and the Examination Standards for Inventions of the Applied
Microbiological Industry promulgated by the Japanese Patent Office in 1970 stated
that microorganisms were unpatentable because they are not industrially
applicable.
PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 97.
46. See Whale, supra note 1,at 107.
47. 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
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ter in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 101.48 The United States
Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that Chakrabarty's
microorganism could be classified as a "manufacture" or "composition of matter" within the meaning of this statute. 49 The Court
ruled that a live, genetically engineered microorganism could therefore fulfill the requirements of utility, novelty, obviousness and
enablement.50
The decision in Chakrabartyhad a profound effect throughout
the world.5 Many other countries have subsequently determined
that certain man-made microorganisms are patentable. 5 2 Microorganisms can now be patented in Austria, Belgium, Great Britain,
Italy, Israel, Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden and West Germany.53 The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia allow a new strain
54
of microorganisms to be protected by an inventor's certificate,
provided that the microorganism is capable of use in an industrial
process. The European Patent Office5 5 has not directly ruled on the
patentability of microorganisms, but undoubtedly will follow the
precedent set by these countries.56 Despite the number of countries
which recognize microorganisms as patentable, the lack of interna48. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
49. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.
50. Chakrabarty, while employed by the General Electric Company, succeeded through
the use of recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid by altering the genetic makeup of some of the
bacteria of the genus Pseudomonas. The altered bacteria could degrade crude oil into a food
source for marine life, therefore, the product became a unique way of removing oil spills.
Prior to Chakrabarty's work, it was found that although various species of Pseudomonas
could degrade one out of the four components of hydrocarbons which make up crude oil, the
species could not co-exist and therefore would not successfully degrade all the components of
crude oil. Id.
51. Clark, Philosopher's Paradise: Should a Microorganism the Product of a Microbiologist be Patentable, 4 AUCKLAND U. L. REV. 129, 143 (1981).
52. Schlosser, Patenting Biological Inventions, 12 U. TOL. L. REV. 925 (1982); see also
PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 136-37.
53. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note

9, at 136-37.

54. Schlosser, supra note 52, at 933-44. Communist countries issue inventor's certificates rather than patents when protecting inventions. The State, not the inventor, owns the
novel product in these countries. Id.
55. The European Patent Office receives the patent applications of inventors of the nations belonging to the European Patent Convention. The European Patent Office determines
whether an application falls under the category of patentable subject matter. A patent search
is also performed at this point. Once found patentable, the application is transmitted to
designated member-countries, who require translation into their own languages and thereafter issue separate national patents. See Winner, supra note 39, at 420.
56. The German Federal Supreme Court (BGH) in the 1975 Backerhefe (Baker's Yeast)
case, having precedent that biology formed part of the technology for which patent protection was available, ruled that microorganisms were patentable. See 1975 GRUR 430; GIIC
207 (1975). However, the question whether and to what extent microorganisms can be pro-
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tional uniformity of patent procedures is prevalent. The reasons
for patenting man-made microorganisms demonstrates the arguments supporting increased uniformity.
D. The Necessity of Patenting Man-Made Microorganisms
The primary objective of a patent system is to stimulate product innovation.5 7 A proper legal system stimulates the expression
of novel ideas through three methods. First, the potential for exclusive commercialization provides an incentive for the inventor to endure the long, frustrating and expensive process of discovering and
developing a product from the stages of research through marketability. 8 The inventor goes through great expense and effort in order to develop the product and to convince others of its unique
value to society.5 9
Second, the new knowledge disclosed in a patent application
allows other experimenters to improve and to develop the patented
product by "inventing around the invention."6 ° A patented invention not only makes the expression of a marketable idea available
to the public, but also encourages the creation of other ideas which
envision modified versions of this product of even greater value. 6'
The notion behind encouraging the publication of novel products is
to allow others access to new and useful information. Once the information is available, researchers can incorporate the concepts
into their own experiments and create even better products.6 2
Third, the patent system saves the time and money of the inventor's competitors. A patent system grants an exclusive property
right in the inventor for a limited period of time. 63 This property
tectedperse is still largely unresolved in the international legal practice. See Teschemacher,
supra note 2, at 27, 30.
57. See Churchwell, Patent Law-Subject Mailer Patentability-Computersand Mathematical Formulas, 14 INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 305 (1982).
58.

See E. PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF AN INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 8 (1951

& reprint 1973).
59. The inventor cannot isolate himself from the world of politics. OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT REP., supra note 18, at 244.

60. Id. at 243.
61. Former President Jimmy Carter stated, "[l]nnovation in the United States badly
needs stimulation." Thereafter he made plans to spur innovation, which included, in part,
enhancing the transfer of information and strengthening the patent system. Watson, The
Patentabilityof Living Organisms, 20 AM. Bus. L.J., 93, 101 (1982).
62. See OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT REP., supra note 18, at 244.

63. The term "exclusive" is misleading. Patent law encourages publication of ideas so
that others can use them. However, the law excludes those who do not compensate the inventor. Id.
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right entitles only the holder to reap the benefits of a marketed in64
vention. Once a patent is granted, the invention becomespriorart
to all subsequent products which lack a sufficient degree of inventiveness.65 Subsequent inventors would be dissuaded from
redeveloping prior art as such acts would constitute infringement.
Inventors would redirect their resources into other areas of research.66 Furthermore, both the individual and society will benefit.
The time and energy of some of the world's best minds would be
67
streamlined into areas of research in dire need of inventive work.
A patent system is therefore essential to the protection of inanzinaie objects.
any afgue that the patenting 0'lividcrg
would have similar positive effects, in addition to providing adequate protection to the applicants. 68 Alternatively, some argue that
other types of legal theories would provide superior protection.69
The consensus among intellectual property experts is that the
patent system will prove to be of major assistance to genetic research. 71 Microorganisms or other man-made life forms deserve
the same type of legal protection as chemical compounds. 7 Many
countries currently recognize the patentability of chemical products
provided that the invention satisfies the requirements of utility,
novelty, nonobviousness and enablement.7 2 Experimentations in
chemistry, although distinct, parallel those in biology in that both
64. For a detailed discussion on the subjects that constitute "prior art," see Chisum,

ForeignActivity. Its Effect on Patentabilityunder United States Law, I I INT'L REV. INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 26 (1980); Chisum, Sources of PriorArtin Patent Law, 52 WASH. L.
REV. 1 (1976). The general rule as to priority of invention is that priority goes to the inventor
who first reduced the embodiment of the invention to practice.
65. Fields v. Schuyler, 472 F.2d 1304, 1305 (1972).
66. See Collins, The Significance of Inventorshio DeterminationsforForeign and Domestic Inventors, 7 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J 117 (1979).
67. Whale, supra note 1, at 108.
68. See Bloom, Designer Genes and Patent Law: .4 Good Fit, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
1041 (1981).
69. An alternative to the patent system is the protection gained through trade secrecy.
Unlike patents, trade secrets protect an inventor's new product not through compensation,
but through censorship of the novel information. This procedure may prevent infringement,
but it also prevents the distribution of new information to society. See Rose, Protecting
Trade Secrets 130 PRAc. L. INST. 9, 11-12 (1981).
70. Talbot, Introduction to Recombinant-DNA Research Development and Evolution of
NIH Guidelines, and ProposedLegislation, 12 U. TOL. L. REV. 805, 806 (1981).
71. At the present time some countries recognize the patentability of chemical compounds created by microorganisms and yet refuse to grant patent protection to the mircroorganism itself. These countries include Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Denmark, Norway,
Finland and Spain. PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 137.

72. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
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use many of the same materials, techniques and theories.7 3 Furthermore, product claims are the only means of protecting all forms
of manufacture and use.74 Providing the very best protection
would arguably encourage full disclosure by potential patent applicants.75 Identical products have been derived through different
methods.76 Unless the product is protected, an inventor would not
have any recourse against others who produce substantially similar
products by different methods.7 7 Likewise, patents could be obtained even if a product encompasses prior art 78 as long as it is
produced by a different method. Product protection would prevent
this problem.7 9
The third supporting authority embodies international policy
which encourages uniformity in the patent laws.8" The general
trend of international jurisprudence has favored the patentability of
microorganisms. 8 ' The benefits of making patent information internationally available would be defeated unless most countries
were to follow this trend. 2 Inventors would be deterred from filing
in countries not following the trend of providing protection to the
actual life form.
Finally, without patent protection of the microbial product,
sample submission8 3 would not occur. 84 In many countries, full dis73. The growth and reproduction of microorganisms involves many chemical reactions.
Microorganisms commonly produce alcohols, acids and aldehydes as byproducts. See J.

supra note 7, at 43.
74. OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT

WATSON,

REP.,

supra note 18, at 24.

75. The following example is an abbreviated list of some of the potentially patentable
microbial products: new microorganisms, processes for making the new microorganisms,
biologically pure cultures of microorganisms, new and old products from new microorganisms, new uses for products from new microorganisms, isolated genes and gene sequences
on other DNA subunits, synthetic genes, plasmids containing inserted genes, fermentation
processes for growing new microorganisms, and new enzymes and reagents and their uses in
making microorganisms. Whale, supra note 1, at 93.
76. Hayashi, supra note 3, at 316.
77. The clause "substantially similar" is used more often in copyright law. A product is
classified as substantially similar when it lacks a sufficient amount of creativity. In patent
law the product must show a "sufficient degree of inventiveness." See text accompanying
note 65.
78. Whale, supra note 1, at 104.
79. See Behringer, Microorganism Patents, 63 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 128 (1981).
80. See Winner, supra note 39, at 419.
81. Work in genetic engineering is taking place overseas. This work originated with the
sponsorship of U.S. companies. These countries also follow the U.S. restrictions on DNA
research. Hayashi, supra note 3, at 306.
82. Id.
83. Sample submission means the submission of a pure culture of the microorganism.
A pure culture is one that is composed of entirely one genus and species of an organism.
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closure of microorganism is best served when the product is submitted to the proper authority.85 Accessibility to the sample gives the
user the ability to reproduce the microorganism without undertaking the expensive process of development. 6
The conclusions provided by these arguments do not reveal the
complete picture. There is authority against providing patents for
man-made microorganisms.8 7 The major arguments are threefold.
The first group opposed to such a system contends that a patent
would not provide sufficient protection for unique organisms. 88 Infringements of these inventions could be difficult to detect.89 When
an appiication is filed, the patent system generally requires the best
mode9 ° of disclosure. Sample submission would probably fulfill
this requirement. 9' A person to whom a sample is released could,
through genetic experimentation, alter or mutate the genetic makeup into an arguably noninfringing but useful species. 92 Thus, the
original patent owner might not be compensated if the mutation
goes undetected. 93 Furthermore, in many countries, the burden of
proving infringement is often difficult to overcome.9" This might
influence the patent owners not to undergo the expensive process of
84. Schlosser, supra note 52, at 944.
85. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 136-37.
86. Most microorganisms can be easily reproduced if a viable sample is passed to someone with the proper instructions for propagation. The process of altering the DNA sequence,
however, can be quite technical, expensive and difficult unless the scientist is familiar with
the organism and the type of experiment that is to be performed. Id. at 45.
87. See Zimmerman, .4 Case .4gainstPatentsforLiving Organisms, 7 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J.
278 (1979).
88. Whale, supra note 1, at 108.
89. Kiley, Learning to Live with the Living Invention, 7 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 220 (1979).
90. The Patent Cooperation Treaty in rule 5.1 (a)(v) contains the requirement that the
best mode be described in an international application. "Best mode" in this context means
depiction that permits the most convenient form of duplication. PATENT RESOURCES
GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 66.

91. See Whale, supra note 1, at 98; see also In re Argoudelis, 434 F. 2d 1390 (1970),
reprinted in 168 U.S. Pat. Q. 99 (1970).
92. The process of genetic engineering involves altering the species genetic makeup to
instill desired characteristics. Such altered genetic elements may be artificially inserted by
scientists into microorganisms with the result that the recipient microorganism takes on new
characteristics which it would not have naturally possessed. These characteristics then become reproduced as part of the normal reproductive process of the microorganism. See
Watson, supra note 61, at 101.
93. It is not clear from the decision in Chakrabarty whether induced mutants will be
considered patentable subject matter. The Court did not address whether a "derivative"
creation gives the original patent owner an action for compensation. See Behringer, supra
note 79, at 134.
94. See Whale, supra note 1, at 108.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol14/iss1/4

12

Schroeder: Patenting Microorganisms: Working the Bugs Out of the Internation
PATENTING MICROORGANISMS

litigation.9 5
This first argument can be defeated through international
mandates for guidelines and strict regulation.9 6 Practices of dangerous genetic alterations will be discouraged if severe sanctions
are levied on the violators. Periodic governmental inspections will
uncover illegal practices. Additionally, violators will more likely
be convicted in those countries having liberal evidence rules.97
A second group asserts that patent protection is unnecessary.
They maintain that genetic experimentation flourished long before
any country recognized its patentability.9 8 Therefore, this faction
contends that substantial incentives exist in this area of experimentation without providing patent protection to microorganisms.99
Giving the scientist legal rights for life forms would only burden
the already overcrowded patent courts."°
This second argument can be attacked constitutionally in
many countries. These nations have supreme laws which require
the continualpromotion of scientific progress. 't Although some incentiveI 2 did exist prior to the patenting of microbial products, total protection through patents has provided even greater
incentives.'" 3 The additional incentives gained through a patent
system would intensify vital cancer, food and energy research. Furthermore, live inventions must receive equal treatment with inanimate inventions, regardless of the supplementary burden placed on
the patent courts. Unequal treatment would be a violation of many
95. Id.
96. Numerous nations have initiated regulatory measures, demonstrating worldwide
concern about and desire for biohazard containment. For example, the European Molecular
Biology Organization has established a standing Advisory Committee on Recombinant
DNA, which met on Feb. 14 and 15, 1976, to discuss the National Institute of Health's (NIH)
guidelines and their suitability for implementation in Europe. While European countries
might accept the general principles embodied in the guidelines, certain procedures may not
lend themselves to easy adaption because Europe does not have an organization equivalent
to NIH. It is therefore not clear who could assume the responsibility of certifying biologically disarmed microorganisms. Comment, Genetic Manipulations. Research Regulation and
Legal Liability Under International Law, 7 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 213 n.5 (1977).
97. See Whale, supra note I, at 108.
98. Id.
99. OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT REP., supra note 18, at 210.
100. See Mossinghoff, American BarAssociation Address, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 342, 343
(1981). There are presently over 200,000 patent applications and 100,000 trademark applications backlogged in the United States.
101. See G. FLONZ, supra note 26, at 36.
102. Boyer, TheAge of Molecular Biology, 7 AM. PAT. L.A. Q.J. 185 (1979).
103. OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT REP., supra note 18, at 240.
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nations' constitutions.'04
The third contingent presents a moral argument against providing patents for man-made microorganisms. 1 5 This group contends that such a procedure of "re-creation" dehumanizes life and
infringes upon their religious values. 10 6 However, the protests of
inhumane experimentation have calmed in recent years. Strict enforcement guidelines regarding the permitted types of genetic experiments have aided the control of dangerous experiments. 0 7
Furthermore, the patent system does not encourage genetic mutations of higher life forms.0 8 Patentable life forms must be capable
of exact duplication. Only microorganisms reproduce with such accuracy. Therefore, until cloning methodology is perfected, higher
life forms will not be patentable, and experimenters will not be able
to obtain the exclusive property right.'0 9 Also, human ownership
through in vitro "0 fetal experiments would not be permitted by
those nations prohibiting involuntary servitude."'I It is doubtful
that the experimenter would undergo the expensive process without
being assured governmental authorization and compensation. "1 2
Genetic engineering with humans will be subject therefore to strict
governmental guidelines.' 1I
In summary, major countries now believe that scientific advancement in genetic engineering will be best served if these products are patentable."14 The impact of the opposing arguments
would be intensified if science progresses to the point of precise
higher life form duplication. The patentability of higher life forms
must be addressed when such techniques become available." 5 A
104. See generally G. FLONZ, supra note 26.
105. Sears, The Concept of Societal Consent for Recombinant-DNA Research and Engineering 12 U. TOL. L. REV. 902 (1981).
106. Id. A major concern is that patent protection for life forms may set precedent to the
patenting of test-tube babies. However, ownership through a patent could not occur in the
United States. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII, which prohibits involuntary servitude.
107. Talbot, supra note 70, at 806.
108. Kass, Patenting Life, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 571, 582 (1981).
109. Patents are an intangible property right, meaning the right to own, use or possess.
See generally I D. CHISUM, PATENTS (1983).
110. In vitro means "within glass" and is used to refer to test-tube reproduction. M.
FROBISHER, R. HINSDILL, K.

CRABTREE, C. GOODHEART, FUNDAMENTALS

OF MICROBI-

124 (1974).
111. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
112. Kiley, supra note 89, at 228.
113. Watson, supra note 61, at 100.
114. Sparrow,-An InternationalComparativeAnalysis of the Patentabilityof RecombinantDNA-Derived Organisms12 U. TOL. L. REV. 926 (1981).
115. Many, but not all countries have excluded animals from patentability. For those

OLOGY
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more pressing issue entails devising the proper methodology for
patenting microorganisms.
II.

THE UNIQUE NATURE OF PATENTING MICROORGANISMS

For the drafter, nothing could be more difficult than to physically conceptualize a life form on paper. Life is continually in motion.1 16 Living matter has properties incapable of visual
perception." 7 Their qualities and attributes are constantly changing."l 8 Most countries have dealt with this drafting problem by creating distinct procedures for patenting live products.
A.

A ComparativeAnalysis

Several distinct foreign procedures for the patenting of microorganisms currently exist." 9 Patent laws around the world require
an inventor seeking protection to fully describe and disclose every
procedural step and detail surrounding the invention. 12 0 This disclosure is required because the invention must be reproducible in
order to benefit the public.' 2 ' Disclosure of most inanimate inventions can be satisfied by descriptions through words, pictures and
diagrams.122 In order to patent a microbial invention, many counwhich have not, one seeking patent protection may have a difficult time satisfying the disclosure requirement. The higher the order of the organism, the more unpredictable is its reproduction. Thus, even though a living sample of the starting material may be available, there is
often no guarantee the offspring will have the same characteristics as the parents. Until the
technique of cloning in higher animals becomes perfected, this unpredictability will be a
serious obstacle to patentability. See In re Merat, 186 U.S. PAT. Q. 471 (1975).
116. See M. STRICKBERGER, GENETICS 3 (1976).
117. Id.
118. A living organism is constantly exchanging substances with the environment. A tree
absorbs water and salt through its roots and absorbs carbon dioxide through its leaves. A
mammal absorbs water and food substances in the intestine and oxygen in the lungs. A
microorganism also has many properties that go undetected through the microscope. Many
are identified by the chemical reactions they produce. J. SMITH, THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION 15 (1975).
119. One of the most interesting systems is the patent system in Yugoslavia. In Yugoslavia, the inventor is given an option to choose between receiving a patent or a certificate of
invention. Where a certificate is chosen, ownership devolves to the State. Janic, Yugoslavia
Patent Law and Practice,reprintedin DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAws OF THE WORLD, PAT-

AND TRADEMARKS 2 (G. Kohlik ed. 1980). In the People's Republic of China, inventions are categorized and "awarded" in accordance with their value in industrial use. The
inventions are classified into four categories. An invention in the top category receives the
greatest cash reward (10,000 yuan). Hsia & Huan, Laws ofthe People's Republic of China and
Industrialand Intellectual Property, 5 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 743, 747 (1973).
120. P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 13, 15 (1982).
121. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
122. Schlosser, supra note 52, at 933.
ENTS
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tries require the deposit of the microorganism with the proper authority. 123 Presently, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the
Soviet Union, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Ireland, the United
States, Yugoslavia and the German Democratic Republic require
the deposit of the microbial invention. 124 In25other countries, the
deposit is recommended but not mandatory.
The European Patent Convention 126 also established various
laws for the patenting of microorganisms. 27 Rule twenty-eight
states:
If an invention contains a microbial nrocess or the product
thereof and involves a microorganism which is not available to
the public, the European patent application and corresponding
patent shall only be regarded as disclosing the invention in a
manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by
a person skilled in the art if: i) a culture of the microorganism
has been deposited in a culture collection not later than the date
of filing the application; and ii) the application as filed gives such
relevant information as is available28 to the applicant on the characteristics of the microorganism.'
The prevailing international viewpoint resolves the technical
problems of describing "live" inventions in patent applications by
creating procedures that allow deposits of viable samples. Many
beneficial aspects subsist by depositing these samples.
123. Id.
124. Id.

125. Although a deposit is not mandatory under Spanish law, they do have strict disclosure requirements. Article 62 of the Spanish Patent Law states: "the description ... must
be so detailed and complete as to be able to be put into practice by a person skilled in the
art." See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 126.
The language in Spain is very broad. Compare this with the Soviet Union which makes
deposit of the microorganism mandatory. Section 44 of their Patent Law requires that:
The description of the invention must state the purpose of the invention and must
describe the invention in detail including its distinctive features; it shall also contain data on the technical and economic effectiveness of the utilization of the invention, the fields of technology to which the invention relates and where the invention
can be utilized, and the claims of the invention.
Id. at 129.
126. See supra note 39. The EPC has eleven member countries. They are: Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Other countries not listed here have also been allowed to
accede. See also Winner, supra note 39, at 420.
127. J.

SINNOT,

supra note 39, at 83-84. See also B. BEETZ,
13 (1978).

PRACTICING UNDER THE

EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION

128. J.

SINNOT,

supra note 39, at 83.
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B.

The Benefits of Depositing the MicrobialInvention

Having revealed the difficulty of describing life forms on paper, the question now becomes whether the deposit satisfies the
requirements of proper disclosure. Practicality and efficiency
demonstrate the necessity for such a procedure.
First and foremost, the procedure has been determined to be
practical. 3 ° Microorganisms can be readily reproduced, or
reproduce themselves, if propagated from a frozen or lyophilized
sample on or in a nutrient media known to cultivate that organism. 3 ' Therefore, a pure culture, once isolated or produced, can be
frozen or lyophilized as a master seed and stored for many years.
This procedure is quite practical, as many domestic patent licenses
run for periods exceeding fifteen years. 132 A subsequent party
could then utilize the invention simply by cultivating the organisms
in the appropriate media under the conditions listed in the original
1 33
patent application.
Second, the procedure of depositing microorganisms conserves
time.' 34 A more accurate description can be made by depositing
the organism, thereby accelerating the patent procedure. 35 If a
subsequent user of a patented microorangism were only supplied
with a written description, the inventor would be forced to redevelop the product. Although some description must accompany the
sample to facilitate cultivation, the written description would be
136
substantially reduced.
1
29

129. See Schlosser, supra note 52, at 932.
130. PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 41.

131. Lyophilization is the process of freeze drying. Some products cannot remain viable
if merely frozen and not freeze dried. The type of storage depends upon the particular organism. Most sample cultures of bacteria and viruses are frozen or lyophilized in the nutrient media in which they are propagated. A common sample might contain 109 organisms
per milliliter. Therefore, when this text refers to "microorganism," it is meant to depict the
entire pure culture of microorganisms. See Kiley, supra note 89, at 228.
132. See G. SPENCER, supra note 30, at 44.

133. The proper patent application is one in which all aspects of the experiment are
listed. This would include a description of the microorganisms' nutrient requirements, such
as coenzymes, starches, sugars and the corresponding quantities of each. A description of the
growth parameters and conditions would also be needed. This description would include the

organisms' temperature, acid, base and oxygen requirements as well as all other conditions
necessary for the organisms' propagation. See H. ZINSSER, MICROBIOLOGY 67 (1976). See
also PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 133 for an example claim of Bacillus

Thuringiensis var.
134. "A bug is worth a thousand words"; see also Teschemacher, supra note 2, at 31.
135. See Lederer, supra note 10, at 289.
136. Schlosser, supra note 52, at 934.
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Moreover, the procedure of depositing the sample is less expensive than the written description typically used for inanimate
inventions. Fewer hours would be required by the drafting attorneys since they would not be required to fully describe the invention on paper. Additionally, the subsequent users could spend less
money developing the patented invention since the product would
be available in its completed form.' 3 7
C

The Needfor a Uniform Depositary System

Due to expensive translation and prosecution costs, the cost of
38
patenting internationally continues to inflate at a shocking pace.
An inventor who seeks to patent his invention in a particular nation
is subject to the domestic laws of that State. 139 Furthermore, the
patent laws of many of these nations require the individual deposit
of a microorganism for that country's patent purpose. 40 In many
cases, deposits made in foreign countries might not be accepted. 141
In many countries, patent applicants who seek to market their
inventions must make individual deposits in each country where
the inventor wishes the invention protected. 142 Numerous deposits
increase the probability of error or omission detrimental to the acquisition of the patent. 143 The inventor, by making deposits in foreign nations, is confronted with unfamiliar languages and
currencies. Further, the inventor must contend with unknown depositary officials over confusing technical, legal and administrative
depositary requirements.144 Many problems could be alleviated by
the establishment of a uniform system throughout the different
countries. The first attempt to create such uniformity in this area
was the establishment of the Budapest Treaty. 145
137. Id.
138. Winner, supra note 39, at 431. A cost estimate for filing foreign applications was
$1000 per case as of May 1978. Present figures for non-English-speaking countries average
over $2000, and in Sweden and Japan may be as high as $4000. (Estimates based on statements for fees received from foreign associates directed to the firm of Sheridan, Ross, Fields
and McIntosh, Denver, Colo., Sept. 1979 through June 1980).
139. G. POLLIZIEN, INTERNATIONAL LICENSING AGREEMENTS 8 (1974).
140. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 136-37.

141. Schlosser, supra note 52, at 935. This would be true in those nations which do not
recognize microorganisms as patentableper se. For a complete compilation of the countries
that recognize microorganisms as patentable per se, see PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC.,
supra note 9, at 136-37.
142. Schlosser, supra note 52, at 935.
143. Id.
144. See Whale, supra note 1, at 107.
145. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 12.
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III.

THE BUDAPEST TREATY: AN INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPT TO
CREATE UNIFORMITY IN THE PATENTING OF
MICROORGANISMS

A.

Background

The Budapest Treaty 46 was designed to eliminate many of the
international problems inherent in the deposit of man-made microorganisms. On April 28, 1977, eighteen nations signed this agreement, 147 which established the International Depositary Authority
(IDA). 148 The purpose of the Treaty was to secure a system of depositaries within the member countries which would reduce the expense and confusion of the international patenting of man-made
microorganisms. 49 First, the agreement provides one set of rules
and requirements for the patenting of microorganisms, which is administered by one organization-the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO). 5 ° This provision facilitates an understanding of applicable patent rules. The patentee need learn only one set
of rules, rather than having to learn the regulations of every country in which protection is sought. Second, the Treaty creates some
uniformity.'' The patentee is able to obtain exclusive patenting
rights in a variety of foreign nations with minimal expense and
52
confusion.
The Treaty provides that an inventor can receive patent protection in all member States with only one deposit. 53 Further, the
Treaty mandates that contracting States which allow or require the
146. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9.
147.

See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 12.

148. Id.
149. Under United States patent law, if an inventor publishes his work or places his
invention on sale, he has one year after making the invention public to file his patent application. During this year he can test the commercial value of his invention and decide whether
it is worth the expense of patenting. Some countries do not allow this grace period. They
hold that if an invention has been published or used anywhere in the world before filing the
application, patenting is absolutely barred. This example illustrates another reason for establishing a uniform system for patenting inventions. See Winner, supra note 39, at 422.
150. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is an intergovernmental organization with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. WIPO promotes the protection of
intellectual property throughout the world through the cooperation of various States. It is
also responsible for the administration of several unions founded on multilateral treaties. A
substantial portion of its activities and resources is devoted to assisting developing countries.
See WIPO, General Information, WIPO Publication No. 400E (1981).
151. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 12.
152.
153.

Schlosser, supra note 52, at 935.
Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, art. I (Establishmentofa Union) (1977).
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deposit of the microorganisms, 154 recognize a deposit in any international depositary authority.'
Such recognition shall include the
fact' 56 and date of the deposit.'
By virtue of these rules, an inventor is assured that the exclusive right of the invention will be
granted in all member States from the time of filing.15 8 This guarantee will continue for the duration of the IDA recognition.'5 9
The Treaty is open to all nations which are members of the
Paris Union Convention. 6 ° All States can become members of the
Convention.'
Therefore, the Budapest Treaty likewise remains
open to all countries who agree to abide by its provisions. 162 The
,,jr, rovisins of Lite Treaty demonstrate the effectiveness ot'a
uniform patent system. Problems arise when the Treaty fails to ex63
tend its authority over international infringements. 1
B.

Requirements to Acquire IDA Status

In order to acquire IDA status, a depositary must fulfill specific requirements provided by the Treaty. 164 First, an institution
must have continual existence within a member State. 165 The
Treaty requires samples in each of the depositaries to be closely
regulated to protect the patentee's rights.16 6 If a depositary were to
transfer samples to a non-member State, compliance with this regulation would be virtually impossible. Second, if a depositary within
a member country ceased to maintain the proper facilities for these
154. The IDA is governed by an International Bureau. The chief executive of the Bureau shall be the chief executive of the Union and shall represent the Union. Budapest
Treaty, supra note 9, art. II, §§ 1-4.
155.

PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 12.

156. Id. at 19.
157. Id.
158. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
159. See infra text accompanying notes 178-185 for a discussion of the length of storage
of a deposited invention.
160. The Budapest Treaty is open to membership to any country belonging to the Paris
Union Convention. Furthermore, Article 9 of the Treaty contains a special provision under
which only intergovernmental organizations having authority to grant regional patents to
several countries may accept certain obligations under the Treaty. See PATENT RESOURCES
GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 14; see also Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, art. 9 (Intergovernmental Industrial Property Organization).
161. Administrative matters will be conducted by the contracting States of the Treaty.
One delegate will represent each country. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9.
162. Id.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See generally PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9.
Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, rule 3 (4cquisition ofthe Status ofthe IDA).
Id. art. 6, § 2.3.
Id. rule 2, § 2.2.
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samples, IDA status would be terminated. ' 67 Third, all institutions
must be impartial and objective.' 6 8 Inventors who may wish to deposit in various nations would be discouraged from patenting
abroad if a member State were to extend preferential treatment to
its citizens.' 6 9 Finally, an institution must accept specified strains
for deposit, 70 examine their viability, and store
of microorganisms
7'
'
them properly.
Problems develop once the depositary of a particular nation
acquires IDA status. The Treaty permits each State to legislate its
own laws for acceptance and release of the samples. Germany has
of international
expressed legitimate doubt as to the effectiveness
72
detection devices for uncovering infringements.
C.

Transfer of Deposits

The Treaty regulations provide an essential safeguard for depositors. 173 If an international depositary authority should temporarily or definitely discontinue performance, the State in which the
depositary is located must transfer all microorganisms without contamination and all accompanying records to another international
depositary. "I Additionally, the IDA must notify all depositors and
the Director General 7 5 of all action taken.' 7 6 This procedure, vital
to the inventor's patent rights, assures the continued maintenance
of deposits in an IDA. 7 7 An inventor must be guaranteed that the
patent rights will be maintained for the statutory period. Inventors
who are promised continual protection will be encouraged to release their products abroad.
D. Length of Storage and Confidentiality
Another Treaty provision requires that microorganisms be
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. art. 8 (Termination and Limitation of the Status of the IDA).
Id. art. 6, § 2.3.
Id. § 2.5.
Id.

171.

See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 20-21.

172. Id.; see also Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5 (Import and Export Restrictions).
173. If a member country refuses to accept a sample, the country must notify the Director
General. The Director General will in turn notify the contracting States involved. Budapest
Treaty, supra note 9, rule 5.2.
174. Id. rule 5 (Storageor Microorganisms).
175. Id. § (a)(4).
176. Id.
177. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 16.
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stored for at least thirty years. 178 Furthermore, the Treaty requires
the IDA to guarantee the secrecy of the inventor's information during this period.' 79 The institution shall not reveal whether the microorganism has been deposited. 18 The depositary may only
divulge this information to either an authorized individual' 8 ' or
one who is legally entitled to this knowledge.' 8 2
The Treaty, within this section, advocates secrecy, yet mandates no provision for restitution if the confidentiality requirement
is violated. The contents of the invention should only be divulged
to persons who have either legal rights or permission from the inventor to gailluaccess to
1a 0. -- The Treaiy has ailowed
each nation to retain jurisdiction over infringement suits within its
boundaries.' 8 4 However, these laws contain substantial disparity as
to the proper legal remedies involved. 185 For example, an inventor
in England might find the relief granted for a secrecy violation in
other countries to be inadequate. If the English inventor were to
find other nations' laws improper, he could be discouraged from
releasing the information beyond English boundaries. A compilation of such examples would have a profound effect on an international patent system.
E.

Redepositing the Microorganism, Maintainingthe Patent

The Budapest Treaty also allows the depositor to make a replacement deposit if the original is lost or destroyed. 186 A replacement, for purposes of deposit, is considered to have been made on
the date of the original filing. 187 The patentee must sign a statement that the new deposit is identical to the microorganism initially
deposited.'t8 This safeguard assures the patentee the exclusive
right to the invention for the statutory period. Additionally, this
178. See Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, rule 9 (Storage of Microorganisms).
179. The rules for granting release of sample will be discussed at length later in this
Comment. See infra text accompanying note 287.
180. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, rule 9.2.
181. Id. rule 11 (FurnishingSamples).
182. See Schlosser, supra note 52, at 935.
183. The Treaty also requires the depositary to check the viability of the organism (a)
promptly after any deposit or transfer; (b) at reasonable intervals, depending upon the species deposited; and (c) at any time requested by the depositor. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9,
rule 10.1.
184. See PATENT RESOURCEs GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 21.

185.
186.
187.
188.

Kiley, supra note 89, at 229.
Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, rule 6.2 (Making a New Deposit).
Id.
Id. rule 6.2(a).
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procedure guarantees that the patent information will be available
to others during this period.' 8 9 Any controversies concerning the
precision of duplication of the original deposit will be resolved by
national or regional law. 190
Disparity between each nation's determination of whether precise duplication occurred could also burden international courts
with numerous suits. Theoretically, the inventor could modify the
organism before resubmission. This replacement might be considered an "exact duplication"' 9 1 in one country and a "derivative"' 92
in another. The problem is exaggerated when the patentee receives
193
additional property rights with a derivative.
F

Depositor'sRequirements Under the InternationalDepositary
Authority

In order for the deposit to receive patent protection, the depositor must fulfill certain requirements under the Treaty. For example, depositors must sign a written affidavit which includes various
declarations. First, inventors must indicate that the deposit complies with the provisions of the Budapest Treaty and the depositor
will not withdraw the information for a minimum of thirty years. 194
Second, inventors must release their name and address to enable
contact by prospective users and the Director General.' 95 Third,
inventors must detail the proper propagation, storage and testing
conditions for the microorganisms. 196 Fourth, the inventor must
indicate the microorganisms' dangerous propensities, or admit to
not knowing whether such potential danger exists. The Treaty recommends, but does not require, that the statement contain a scien189. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
190. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 31; see also Budapest Treaty,
supra note 9, art. 4(2).
191. "Exact duplication" means isolated from the original culture and patented without
any further genetic engineering performed. See Whale, The ABCD's of PatentInfringement,
62 J.PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 136, 137 (1980). A direct infringement requires doing the same thing
in the same way to get the same result. This could be called "umbral" infringement. It
forces the defendant to do a microinspection of the patent records. But direct infringement is
also doing substantially the same thing in substantially the same way to substantially get the
same result. Id.
192. "Derivative" means isolated from the original culture but altered in some way
through genetic engineering. See Behringer, supra note 79, at 134.
193. The inventor may make a derivative that has more usefulness in the commercial
market than the microorganism originally deposited. Id.
194. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, rule 6(a) (Making the Original Deposit).

195. See

PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC.,

supra note 9, at 32-34.

196. Id. at 32.
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tific description of the organism.1 97
The IDA may refuse to accept the deposit regardless of
whether the above requirements are met. For example, the microorganisms might not be of a species for which the IDA gives assurances of patentability. Furthermore, the IDA might also not be
suited to handle the properties of a particular organism, or the deposit may be defective for scientific reasons. 9 ' Therefore, the
Treaty does not specify criteria for member countries to determine
whether a certain microorganism is patentable subject matter.' 99
This question is resolved by the patent laws of each country. 2"
However, individual depositaries can specify the categories of microorganisms which would be acceptable. The depositary can transmit this list to the Director General.2 0 Therefore, an inventor can
discover whether a country would accept his deposit without having to translate foreign laws.
In all cases, once a Treaty depositary accepts an organism, the
date of patent protection relates back to the original date of deposit.2" 2 This benefit can be significant when competing inventors
race to obtain exclusive rights to a unique and potentially valuable
20 3

invention.

G. Accessibility to the Deposited Samples
Opponents of the Treaty predominantly criticize the regulations which direct the furnishing of a deposited sample to subsequent third-party users. 2" Under the rules of the Treaty, thirdparty users can gain access to deposits in three situations. First, the
depositor may directly authorize access to the user. 0 5 Second, a
national granting authority20 6 may itself gain access to a deposit.
Finally, if the subsequent third-party user does not qualify under
these situations but is legally entitled to obtain the sample, he might
197. Id.
198. Id. at 33.
199. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
200. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, rule 6.1(B).
201. Id. rule 3.1 (Communication).
202. Id. art. 4 (l)(d). The new deposit shall be treated as if it had been made on the date
which the original deposit was made, if viable, and where it is made within three months
after the depositor received notification of the organisms lack of viability.
203. See Watson, supra note 61, at 101.
204. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, rule 1 (Furnishingof Samples).
205. Id. § 11.2.
206. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 23.
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also gain access.2 °7 Apparently, authority under the first two sections does not pose problems if the sample is used only for patent
experimentations authorized by the States.2 °8 Several problems
have arisen, however, regarding the third mode of access.
The Treaty does not propose specific laws for access by a thirdparty user. These regulations are legislated by the country in which
the depositary is located. 20 9 Therefore, although an inventor can
acquire protection in all member countries with only one deposit,
each country may select those individuals who are entitled to the
depositor's samples. Under the third course of access, a party must
adhere to the laws of the country in which the sample is acquired,
210
even if the inventor intends to use the sample in another nation.
In order to acquire access to a sample in another country, the user
must request a sample through an official form which bears an authorized certification.2 1 ' Certification occurs only when the laws of
the country in which the depositary is located are fulfilled. Therefore, a State can potentially restrict access to all samples within its
depositaries.
A country which restricts access, however, must submit a statement justifying this decision to the Director General and the International Bureau.21 2 Furthermore, a person who is unjustifiably
denied access to a sample can submit a formal request to the Director General to terminate the institution's status as a member of the
IDA.213 Upon such a request, the Bureau has the duty to investigate the situation and determine whether the complaint is well
founded.2 14
These regulations are an effective safeguard against prejudicial
restrictions imposed upon foreign users. However, the laws do not
have sufficient clarity in all situations. For example, contracting
States might justify restrictive actions as being necessary to the
health and safety of the nation.2 15 Problems arise when certain
countries abuse their sovereign privilege. Claims of health and
207.
Treaty,
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

The user may be given permission by a licensee of the original creator. Budapest
supra note 9, § 11.3.
Id. § 11.1.
PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 25.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, rule 3.1.
Id. art. VIII (Termination and Limitation of the Status of the IDA).
Id. rule 3.1(c).
Lederer, supra note 10, at 293.
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safety violations could entail hints of sovereign prejudice.2 16 Such
claims would have a deterrent effect on foreign patent applicants.
Foreign inventors must be accorded equal treatment in all member
countries, otherwise the purpose of the Treaty-to establish a uniform patent system-would be defeated.
The Budapest Treaty also authorizes contracting States to
deny access to the depositaries. A contracting nation can impose
import and export restrictions on samples located within its depositaries.2 17 The Treaty, however, does not provide regulations which
can countermand the export and import restrictions of a member
country. The Treaty merely encourages each member to restrict
access to its depositaries if the limitation is necessary to prevent
contamination of the environment and to preserve national
security.2 18
The problems of international accessibility present many vital
issues. One major question is whether the IDA should have the
authority to overrule export and import restrictions. This problem
is immediate, since Germany has already passed laws which completely restrict exportation of German samples. 2 ' 9 The United
States is presently contemplating the enactment of similar laws.
These laws could have significant ramifications if adopted on a
world-wide basis. The principle objective of the Treaty is to encourage transfer of valuable technology. A multitude of restrictive
laws would shatter any homogeneity and thwart the Treaty's
objectives.
The Budapest Treaty, therefore, falls far short of its goals. The
Treaty advocates secrecy, but mandates no provision for uniform
enforcement. The Treaty grants inventors a right for resubmission
in the case of sample destruction, yet fails to control resubmission
abuses. Finally, the Treaty permits multiple patent grants upon
one deposit, but does not warrant sample release to each State. The
foregoing problems are clearly evidenced by examining underdeveloped and developed nations' exercise of sovereign rights.
IV.

THE FAILURES OF THE BUDAPEST TREATY: EXERCISING
SOVEREIGN RIGHTS

A developed invention, to be considered patentable, must meet
216. See Landau, supra note 15, at 140.
217. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5 (Export and Import Restrictions).
218. PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 29.
219. Id. at 81.
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the requirement of utility, novelty, nonobviousness and enablement. 220 An invention with societal value must enable others to
gain access to the information. 22 ' Additionally, inventions geometrically accelerate the development of other ideas and new products
into the market.2 22 The resulting effect propels society forward
with creative products which facilitate an easier lifestyle. International patents allow the world to gain more information than any
individual nation could acquire.
Individual countries, as well as the international community,
suffer from the prohibition of access to new information.2 2 3 However, certain situations require the preservation of independence,
national security, health and environmental conditions, and demand certain restrictions regarding access to the information.
The Budapest Treaty leaves vital areas of control open to preemption by member nations. Uniformity is advocated but not fulfilled. These shortcomings are evidenced by the past restrictive
measures of Third World nations and by those of Germany.
.4.

Third World Restrictions Under the Paris Union Convention

Industrialized nations have argued against the admission of
Third World States in an international patent system. 224 A tremendous disparity of wealth and knowledge exists between developed
and underdeveloped countries. 22 1 Discontent over former colonialism has inspired Third World nations to achieve identity through
independent sovereignty. These nations have impeded worldwide
transfer by restricting the importation of technology and foreign
investment.22 6 These States have equated industrialization with colonial dictatorships. Furthermore, they have also prohibited an iflux of genetic technology. Genetic experimentation contravenes
many Third World nations' ideals of morality.2 2 7
Industrialized nations have criticized the membership of Third
World countries in the Paris Union Convention, contending that
220. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
221. Id.
222. In the United States not all improved inventions are patentable. For example, the
new use doctrine bars the discoverer of a new use for a known compound from obtaining a
patent with composition claims regardless of the level of inventiveness exercised. I A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS 244-72 (1964).

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Landau, supra note 15, at 105.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 115.
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the Third World's restrictive laws defeat uniformity. Furthermore,
technology released*from Third World nations is minimal as compared with technological achievement in developed nations.2 28
These arguments were addressed at the revised Paris Union
Convention of 1967.229 The Convention concluded that the advantages of Third World membership outweigh the disadvantages.23 °
Third World membership in an international patent system maintainspartialuniformfty .23 1 Although these countries retain special
sovereign rights, the importation of some technology is allowed.2 32
The accepted inventions allow advancement, at least, to a minimal
degree. ithe industrialized countries were to expel Third World
nations from the uniform patent system, importation would occur
at a far slower pace. Disparity of wealth and ideas would continue
to expand.2 33 Developed countries would also suffer since the
Third World nations would be dissuaded from internationally releasing the few discoveries they do uncover.
Additionally, Third World nations provide adequate reciprocity. Some countries have achieved specialization in areas which remain untouched in developed nations. Multinational corporations
now develop natural resources in Third World nations. 234 Therefore, unless these countries are admitted to a uniform system, the
incentive to market their resources will be insubstantial. The incentive to have these countries market abroad is essential to decrease the huge disparities between Third World nations and the
industrialized countries.
The examples set by the Paris Union Convention should be
regarded as legal international precedent to the Budapest Treaty.
The arguments presented demonstrate the reasons for unrestricted
membership to the Paris Union Convention. Members of the Paris
228. Whatever the ultimate causes may be, the underdeveloped nations depend for their
growth on the techniques of the advanced countries . . . the third world nations can not
achieve more than a few firms in each industry. Hence the third world nations must rely

more and more upon the techniques and products imported from developed countries. Id. at
112.
229. See Gansser, supra note 16, at 148.

230. Id.
231. If these countries are admitted, at least some technology will travel between developed and underdeveloped nations. These nations do not prohibit all importation. See Landau, supra note 15, at 134.
232. Id.

233. Id.
234. Patents granted by Third World nations are mostly received by foreign corporations. 1d. at 106.
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Union Convention are invitees of the Budapest Treaty. 235 The
Convention passed special laws 236 which have encouraged Third
World nations to join the uniform patent system.2 37 The Budapest
Treaty should, likewise, encourage nations to adopt the uniform
system of patenting life forms. Germany's restrictive laws, however, pose a threat to the uniform system.
B.

Germany's Exercise of Restrictions Under the Budapest Treaty

Germany is one member of the Budapest Treaty which has
passed confined laws.238 The development of these restrictive regulations was triggered by the shortcomings of other German patent
laws. In Germany, as in many other European countries under the
European Patent Convention, the file of a patent application is
open to the public at any stage of the examination procedure.23 9
The German laws differ from United States patent rules in that the
release of information is allowed only after a patent has been
granted.24 ° In the United States, information is protected once legally available to the public.
Germany's laws were founded on the principle that information should be disclosed at the earliest possible date: the point of
publication of an unexamined application. A deposited microorganism is considered part of disclosure and, consequently, should be
released at the point of application. 24' Therefore, under current
German law, a sample will be released to third-party users without
patent protection. Applicants may, however, require recipients to
identify themselves and agree not to transmit samples to subsequent users. 2 42 Third-party users must also agree to use the sample
in a manner conforming to German patent law.243 Apparently,
Germany feels secure that German citizens will abide by these
235. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, art. 9 (Intergovernmental Industrial
Property
Organizations).
236. The laws included changes in: 1) national treatment; 2) right of priority; 3) independence of patents; 4) compulsory licensing and forfeiture; and 5) importation of articles and
products manufactured by a process patented in the importing country. See Landau, supra
note 15, at 139.
237. Id.
238. The others include the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Sweden and
Italy. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 136.
239. See Lederer, supra note 10, at 292.
240. See Feldman v. Aunslup, 517 F.2d 1351 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
241. Lederer, supra note 10, at 292.
242. Id. The decision in BGH "Btckerhefe" GRUR 430 (1975) which confirmed this
rule is still current law.
243. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, rule I1.3(a)(iii).
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laws. The recent German export and import restrictions, however,
suggest that the government was not willing to trust the citizens of
other nations. Germany's position is founded on several
arguments.
1. CompensationforInfringements Abroad. If a product is a
viable microorganism, transfer of the invention is quite simple. Microorganisms multiply exponentially when proper environmental
conditions are maintained. 2" Thus, an unauthorized user who acquires a microorganism from the IDA could transmit the product
with little oppor.urhity for objection by the originl pntentee 245
Unauthorized transmission is more probable when the subsequent
user is in another country.
In many situations, the original patentee and the depositary
have virtually no opportunity to effectively police the unauthorized
use of inventions. Following the original deposit, once an infringing product appears in another member country's market, an action
for compensation becomes available as a legal remedy.2 46 In many
situations, however, the original microorganism could be genetically altered, which may deny the original patentee
compensation.2 4 7
The current international law classifying the types of "derived" organisms which are protected is unclear. 248 Through the
discovery of recombinant DNA 249 and the subsequent advances in
technology, genetic alterations are not terribly difficult. 210 The
DNA sequences of one organism can be artificially introduced into
the DNA sequences of another microorganism, eventually produc244. See H. ZINSSER, supra note 133, at 68.
245. G. TAYLOR, THE BIOLOGICAL TIME BOMB 9 (1968).
246. One of the reasons for allowing sample submission for the deposit of microorganisms is that they can be reproduced in virtually equivalent form as the original. The arguments against allowing samples for higher life forms arise because these organisms do not
duplicate with such exactness. See Zimmerman, The Case Against Patentsfor Living Organisms, 7 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 278 (1979).
247. See Behringer, supra note 79, at 134.
248. Id. at 133-34.
249. Recombinant DNA is the DNA of one organism inserted into the gene sequence of
another. In bacteria, the DNA is isolated from small circular loops in their cytoplasm called
plasmids. These plasmids can be isolated from the bacterial cell and cut open by a restriction
endonuclease enzyme. From another organism (plant, frog, fly or man) the DNA of the cells
can also be isolated through the use of these enzymes. When the pieces of DNA are mixed in
vitro and recombined, a new bacteria can be created with an entirely different genetic sequence. For a visual description, see Talbot, supra note 70, at 804, 805.
250. See Behringer, supra note 79, at 137.
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ing an organism which is quite different. 2 5 1 A similar experiment
with recombinant-DNA was used by Chakrabarty to yield oil eating bacteria. 2 Furthermore, alterations of the microorganism can
now be synthesized without destroying the basic utility of the invention. Although the microorganisms could be genetically different, the new microorganisms might be as useful an invention as the
original patented product. Therefore, unless the patent law applies
to organisms "derived from"25' 3 the original deposit, the patentee's
original idea could be infringed upon without providing a cause of
action.
Presently, only the European Patent Convention, whose members are invitees of the Budapest Treaty,25 4 has passed a provision
which restricts uncompensated "derived organisms."2'5 5 The European Patent Convention defines a "derived culture" as one which
still exhibits those characteristics of the deposited culture which are
essential to effectuate the invention.2 56 Therefore, Germany justifies the laws restricting access to their depositaries on the grounds
that their government cannot effectively control the unauthorized
appropriation of an inventor's microorganism outside Germany.
Although Germany can police patent infringement more effectively
within its boundaries, a total ban on importation and exportation is
much too stringent.
2. Potential Safety Hazards. Germany also maintains that
the purposes of these measures were to promote national security,
health and environmental safety. Microorganisms can be altered to
benefit society but can also be altered to create potentially dangerous forms. Segments of DNA from a pathogenic organism, transmuted into the DNA of a patented bacteria, can procreate an
organism that produces a disease for which there is no known
cure. 257 Most countries prohibit this type of dangerous experimentation,2 58 but the hazard would be even more prevalent if such or251. The Monsanto Corporation has recently found a way to transfer a genetic trait from
a bacterium to a plant cell. San Diego Union, Jan. 19, 1983, at A19, col. 4.
252. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, supra note 49, at 310.

253. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9.
254. Id. art. 9.
255.

PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 35. The European Patent Con-

vention derived much of its substantial law from the 1963 Strasbourg Convention. This Convention is also open to any member of the Paris Union. Id.
256. Teschemacher, supra note 2, at 40.
257. See Sears, supra note 105, at 902.
258. Talbot, supra note 70, at 806.
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ganisms were to find their way into the hands of terrorist groups. If
the patentee or the depositary is unable to police the transfer of the
patented organism within another country, the problem becomes,
in fact, a real one. Therefore, until sufficient safeguards exist in all
member countries, import and export restrictions may be the most
practical methods of control.
3. Other Problems with the Depositary System. Another risk
embodied in the present depositary system is the possibility that a
deposited culture may arrive at a depositary in a nonviable conditio~ in, wvhich _

dep

t date
Aptnedi.. ,-,, bep

259 Tf

aA,+,

not secured, the resulting invention will not be protected.26 ° Under
the Budapest Treaty, the legal consequences of an initial negative
viability test are left to the discretion of each nation.26 1 The Treaty
only safeguards the loss of viability of a deposit after the original
sample has been accepted.2 6 2 The Treaty provides that if the original deposit is lost or destroyed, a depositor may supply an identical
substitute culture without loss of the original date of deposit.26 3
The procedure does not extend protection to a deposit which before
acceptance, and through no fault of a depositor, is not deemed
viable.
Additionally, various countries might prohibit certain claims
on the ground that the deposited organism is not considered patentable subject matter. Therefore, even if an inventor seeks to market
his invention in all member nations, the microorganism must be of
the type which will be accepted. The protection would be limited
solely to those countries which regard the microorganism as patentable. Moreover, an inventor will expect the invention to be protected by virtue of acceptance in other member States. A uniform
rule is therefore necessary. 26
Another problem concerns the lack of uniformity regarding
the periods of time for which culture deposits must be maintained.2 65 Many countries require maintenance of the cultures
throughout the life of the patent; 266 others require maintenance be259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4(l)(a).
Id.
PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 31.
Id.
Id.
Hayashi, supra note 3, at 306.
PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 21.
Id.
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yond the life of the patent. 267 The requirement for maintenance
subsequent to the patent life reflects the policy that a culture should
remain available after the life of the patent. If the product becomes
unavailable, the original patentee could retain his exclusive rights
well beyond the life of the patent, as the sole person able to use and
experiment with the microorganism.
This problem, however, seems unlikely. During the lifetime of
the patent, an individual who acquires the sample can establish his
own permanent sample through recultivation and storage.2 6 8
merely increase the
Therefore, a post-protection requirement would
269
cost and complexity of the patenting process.
Some problems in the Treaty could be easily remedied. Other
areas, however, deserve more consideration by the member
countries.
V.

PROPOSALS FOR AN AMENDED TREATY

Germany's restrictions have caused significant international
concern. The United States is contemplating the enactment of similar laws. 27 ° Although the laws imposed on inventors by Germany
would maintain closer scrutiny of potential infringements, the effects deter international dissemination of information. The following suggestions could be more practical for all countries concerned.
A.

Penalty Clauses Should be Specified in GreaterDetail

The Budapest Treaty does not mandate a uniform set of rules
for secrecy violations. The Treaty must dictate more specific penalty clauses for the misuse of the deposited organisms. Additionally, all users should be required to report the status and location of
the original deposit to the IDA.27 1 Furthermore, if any misuses are
discovered, the Treaty should mandate strict penalties to the original user. This may be a harsh rule, especially if the original user is
not the individual violating the safety regulations. However, the
rule would deter the original users from passing on a sample without authorization.2 7 2 Finally, if the laws were uniformly strict, in267. Id.
268. Kiley, supra note 89, at 228.
269. Teschemacher, supra note 2, at 29.

270. Telephone interview with Mr. Koch, Patent attorney from Alexandria, Virginia,
specializing in international patent law, Oct., 1982.
271. See supra notes 204-14 and accompanying text.

272. Id.
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ventors would trust foreign depositaries, thus encouraging
international marketing of inventions.
B.

A Un!form Set of Rulesfor PatentabilityMust be Mandated
by the Treaty

In order to create uniformity of patent procedures among the
member nations, the Treaty must promulgate rules establishing the
273
products which will be recognized as patentable subject matter.
The rules should provide a list of microorganisms known to be
ableperse .275 Further, the Treaty must be amended to incorporate
all elements necessary for patentability. 276 The present Treaty is
noticeably vague on this point. 27 7 This amendment would provide
inventors in all member countries with a clear understanding of
those inventions which will be recognized as patentable. The clarity would help inventors change research into areas which would
yield patentable and eventually profitable inventions. Once made
aware of unpatentable microorganisms, it is unlikely that inventors
would spend time and money in their research. One objective of
the Treaty was to eliminate much of the cost and confusion of patenting abroad. An international definition of patentable subject
matter would fulfill this objective.
C

The Treaty Should Extend the Exclusive Rights of the
PatentedMicroorganismsto All "Derived Cultures"

The Treaty must define the term "derived culture. ' 27 8 This
definition should be more detailed than the one described in the
European Patent Convention. 27 9 This definition would provide the
273. Id. at notes 31-37.
274. "Potentially" in this situation should be defined as having the strong possibility of
developing into actuality. See WEBSTER'S SEVENTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 665 (1969).
275. Not only should the product be excluded from patentability, but also the processes,
techniques and components of these organisms should be likewise excluded from patentability. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1028 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
276. The Treaty should establish a complete compilation of the requirements necessary
for patentability. A uniform rule should be established so that foreign inventors will have a
better understanding of rules abroad.
277. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2 (Definitons).
278. The definition could read: A "derivative" organism is an organism received from a
specific source or origin having properties and qualities which lack a sufficient degree of
inventiveness from previously patented organisms. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 275, at 399.
279. Lederer, supra note 10, at 296.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol14/iss1/4

34

Schroeder: Patenting Microorganisms: Working the Bugs Out of the Internation
PATENTING MICROORGANISMS

IDA, depositors, and all subsequent users with insight as to which
products infringe upon the original deposit. Additionally, the
Treaty must guarantee that all users of "derived cultures" be penalized for not compensating the original patentee. Such sanctions
would deter unauthorized transfer of samples by third-party users.
Therefore, the Treaty would grant the foreign inventor an international property right.28 0 Furthermore, a uniform remedy would
create an understandable register of the remedies available. If inventors are assured a protectable property right, they would be encouraged to release a new discovery into the international
community.
D.

Viability Must be Uniformly Establishedto Take Effect on the
Date of the OriginalDeposit

A patentee should not be penalized if, absent any fault of his
own, the IDA does not find his product viable and, therefore, does
not grant acceptance. 28 1 The Treaty allows for a replacement sample without losing the original deposit date. However, when the
microorganism loses its viability after deposit, but before acceptance,2 82 the IDA does not allow the inventor to retain the original
deposit date.283 It would be more practical if a replacement sample
is allowed, under certain circumstances, even if initial viability is
not found. A determination of initial nonviability should give a
good faith inventor the right to make two additional deposits. This
opportunity would safeguard any negligence on the part of the de284
positary. However, if the third sample were found "inherently"
nonviable, the patentee would be bound to redraft his instructions
and reexperiment with the organism.
E. Protection Should be Givenfrom the Point of Application
Germany could minimize the risk of uncompensated transfer
of samples by providing immediate patent protection once the deposit is made. Germany's law currently requires depositaries to re280. See Gansser, supra note 16, at 168.
281. PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 33.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. "Inherent" in this situation should be defined: "The condition of the essential character is such that it will be habitually repeated under identical conditions." WEBSTER'S NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 593 (1976). This suggestion may, however, run counter to the
requirement that the inventor must reduce the embodiment to practice before protection can
be obtained. See supra note 64.
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lease samples, even if the sample is not protected by a patent.28 5
Germany believes that the risk of infringement is greater outside its
jurisdiction.2 86 Although the effectiveness of German law within its
boundaries is unclear, domestic infringement will probably occur
once genetic technology advances to the level which has been obtained in the United States. Germany could eliminate the risk by
echoing the patent laws of the United States and providing immediate protection from the time of application.
F

Impose Harsh Safety Regulations

If the Treaty imposes stricter safety regulations, member countries would be encouraged to allow accessibility to their depositaries. It is unlikely that member nations, such as Germany, would
agree to the International Bureau28 7 or WIPO exclusively regulating the accessibility of the samples at the IDA within their country.
However, WIPO or the Bureau must a least encourage all member
States to allow for accessibility unless a sample poses real dangers.
All of the proposed suggestions would discourage nations such
as Germany and the United States from imposing import and export restrictions. The international flow of novel information,
which was one of the original objectives of the Budapest Treaty,
must be maintained. If Germany prohibits access, other nations
will soon follow. Therefore, member countries must take immediate action to prevent a cascade of new restrictions.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Genetic engineering could become the genesis of cancer eradication. 28 8 This former unattainable vision has become a legitimate
theory indebted to incentives created by the patent system.2 8 9 Additionally, other valuable microbial inventions are attributed to
patent inducement.29 ° Internationalpatentsystems would undoubtedly accelerate inventiveness in genetic engineering at even a
greater pace than provided by domestic patent systems. Concern
285. See Lederer, supra note 10, at 296.
286. Id.
287. See Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, art. Ii, for the requirements the Treaty edicts for
the International Bureau.
288. See M. STRICKBERGER, supra note 116, at 570.

289. See Behringer, supra note 79, at 137.
290. "The important and laudable achievement in insulin copying supports the positive
expectations of scientists to the potential benefit of millions of persons now living and yet to
be born." Kiley, supra note 89, at 224.
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over the effectiveness of infringement control has, however, posed a
threat to international patent systems. 29 1 Recent restrictions imposed by members of the Budapest Treaty 292 contravene the objectives established during the origins of patent law.
The origins of patent law demonstrate a major objective for
devising a patent system-to encourage the dissemination of novel
ideas.29 3 In order to be considered patentable, an invention must
fulfill several requirements.29 4 A majority of industrialized countries maintain that certain living organisms can fulfill the requirements of utility, novelty, nonobviousness and enablement.2 9 5
Additionally, protection of the microorganisms through patents is
favored internationally.29 6
The patenting of microorganisms entails unique procedures.
Generally, inventors should use the best mode for disclosing inventions to assure an effective patent system. 297 The best mode for disclosing microorganism is the deposit of a viable sample.2 98
Individuals wishing to utilize the invention could reproduce it by
cultivating the microorganism under the appropriate conditions
enumerated in the patent application. 299 This procedure is clearly
more practical than an application consisting of only written
descriptions. 3"
The Budapest Treaty demonstrates the numerous problems inherent in the depositing of microorganisms."' The Treaty has eliminated much of the cost and confusion in the international
patenting of microorganisms.30 2 However, the Treaty contains several shortcomings. For example, each member nation determines
which individuals may gain access to the samples in the depositaries located within its boundaries. This rule has permitted Germany to restrict total importation and exportation of its samples.30 3
Germany has valid arguments to support these restrictions.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

See supra notes 238-69 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 270-287.
See supra text accompanying notes 130-145.
See supra text accompanying notes 238-243.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

37

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 1 [], Art. 4
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL

LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 14

International availability of these samples makes infringement
more probable. 3" Furthermore, Germany is concerned that infringement is a significant threat to international safety. 30 5 Moreover, Germany could cite the Paris Conventions' rules, allowing
Third World nations to restrict importation of technology, as inter3 6
national legal precedent for its actions. 1
The limitations imposed by Germany and Third World nations will deter international publication of novel information.
Therefore, the Treaty must be amended in order to discourage Germany and other nations concerned from passing restrictive laws.
The Budapest Treaty has been successful in many areas. This
agreement has encouraged cooperation between contracting nations to provide uniform patent laws. A uniform system is necessary to make international distribution of information
commonplace. Changes are necessary, however, so that the Treaty
is not rendered moot through the passage of restrictive laws by contracting States. The problem is immediate, and the World Intellectual Property Organization should call for a meaningful meeting to
resolve the numerous conflicts which presently exist.
Steven D. Schroeder

304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 220-237.
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